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STATE LIABILITY FOR JUDICIAL DECISIONS IN EUROPEAN
UNION AND INTERNATIONAL LAW
ARWEL DAVIES*
Abstract As a consequence of the state unity theory, the conduct of all state
organs is attributed to the state in an undiﬀerentiated manner. It follows that,
in both international and European Union law, state liability can be based on
the substance of judicial decisions despite the independence of the judicial
branch. However, beyond the matter of attribution, there is a signiﬁcant
divergence between the two legal systems. In international law, the judicial
origin of challenged decisions does not inﬂuence the application of liability
criteria, whereas, in EU law, the liability criteria can be applied to judicial
decisions in a tightened manner. This article has the twofold aim of
establishing and explaining this diﬀerence.
I. INTRODUCTION
State liability for judicial decisions in European Union (EU) and international
law has its origin in the perception of the state as a single entity or unity.
In both legal systems, the conduct of all state branches is therefore attributed
to the state in an undiﬀerentiated manner. Despite this commonality, the
two systems diverge on the application of the conditions under which
state liability for mistaken judicial decisions can be incurred. In international
law, the general position that state responsibility can be incurred for
any breach applies in the same manner to all state branches. In contrast,
the general position in EU law which requires a suﬃciently serious breach
can be applied in an especially strict manner to judicial decisions. Therefore,
the general position applies in an undiﬀerentiated manner to all state branches
in international law, whereas, in EU law, there can permissibly be a
tightening of the already strict conditions for liability in respect of judicial
decisions. This article establishes this diﬀerence and evaluates possible
explanations.
The speciﬁc inspiration for these enquiries is that the literature on state
liability for judicial decisions is rather compartmentalized. While the EU law
position has been considered from the perspective of what is recognized in
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Member States,1 it has not been considered with reference to the international
law position. From the Member State perspective, the prevailing view might
well be that a rigid liability threshold for all state organs would be
‘conceptually inappropriate as well as practically inept’.2 However, this
position cannot be accepted as self-evidently correct when the comparison is
between EU and international law. It becomes necessary to ask why the
undiﬀerentiated approach favoured in international law gives way to a
diﬀerentiated approach in EU law.
The discussion is divided into three main parts. Section II considers the
international law position.3 It discusses a shift in the dominant underlying
theory from judicial independence to unity of the state. It follows from this
shift that the conduct of state organs is attributed to the state in an
undiﬀerentiated manner. With reference to a number of case law sources, it is
established that this position is embedded despite an isolated judicial
pronouncement to the contrary. Also addressed is the relationship between
state unity or undiﬀerentiated attribution, and the scope for diﬀerentiating
between state organs when assessing whether the conduct complained of
amounts to a violation. The argument presented is that undiﬀerentiated
attribution suggests that all state organs should incur responsibility in an
undiﬀerentiated manner. Therefore, the international system can be regarded as
giving eﬀect not only to the strict requirement of the state unity theory
(undiﬀerentiated attribution), but also to a natural implication ﬂowing from the
theory (undiﬀerentiated liability conditions in content and application).
Section III turns to state liability for judicial decisions in EU law4 with
reference to the Köbler5 case of 2003 in which the possibility of Member State
liability for decisions of ﬁnal appeal courts contrary to EU law was ﬁrst
recognized by the European Court of Justice (ECJ). The section focuses on the
ECJ’s reasons for the permission to apply the liability criteria in a tightened
1 K Scherr, The Principle of State Liability for Judicial Breaches: The Case of Gerhard Köbler
v. Austria under European Community Law and from a Comparative National Law Perspective
(European University Institute, Florence, 1998). For a comparison between national jurisdictions,
see M Cappelletti, ‘Who Watches the Watchmen? A Comparative Study on Judicial
Responsibility’ (1983) 31 AmJCompL 1, 14.
2 D Nassimpian, ‘. . .And we Keep on Meeting: (de)fragmenting State Liability’ (2007) 32 EL
Rev 831.
3 On state liability for judicial decisions in international law, see AV Freeman, The
International Responsibility of States for Denial of Justice (Longman, London/New York, 1938);
J Paulsson, Denial of Justice in International Law (CUP, Cambridge, 2005).
4 On this subject area, see, among other contributions, H Toner, ‘Thinking the Unthinkable?
State Liability for Judicial Acts After Factortame (III)’ (1996) 17 YB EurL 169; PM Rodríguez,
‘State Liability for Judicial Acts in European Community Law: The Conceptual Weaknesses of the
Functional Approach’ (2004) 11 ColumJEurL 605; G Anagnostaras, ‘Erroneous Judgments and
Prospect of Damages: the Scope of the Principle of Governmental Liability for Judicial Breaches’
(2006) 31 EL Rev 744–5; B Beutler, ‘State Liability for Breaches of Community Law by National
Courts: Is the Requirement of a Manifest Infringement of the Applicable Law an Insurmountable
Obstacle?’ (2009) 46 CMLR 781–2;
5 Case C–224/01 Köbler v Austria [2003] ECR I–10239.
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manner, being ‘the speciﬁc nature of the judicial function and . . . the legitimate
requirements of legal certainty’.6 As this permission is at odds with the
international law position, the section questions whether these considerations
withstand scrutiny as reasons for the exceptional nature of liability for judicial
decisions. It is argued that little weight can be attributed to the nature of the
judicial function in this context. On the other hand, legal-certainty based
concerns provide a more compelling explanation, thereby providing normative
content for a diﬀerentiated approach to liability for judicial decisions. It follows
that EU law can be regarded as giving eﬀect only to the strict requirement of
the state unity theory (undiﬀerentiated attribution), but not also to a natural
implication ﬂowing from the theory (undiﬀerentiated liability conditions in
content and application).
Section IV identiﬁes and evaluates possible explanations for this diﬀerence.
The obvious starting point here is legal certainty. As this is a valid reason
for tightened liability conditions in EU law, it is questioned whether legal-
certainty based concerns are less pronounced in the international law context.
This is indeed found to be the general position albeit that it is necessary to draw
distinctions between diﬀerent international law contexts. The second and third
explanations consider Köbler liability as an aspect of European integration, and
judicial cooperation. Both these considerations provide a means of under-
standing not only why it was vital to recognize the possibility of state liability
for judicial decisions in EU law, but also why this could be only be recognized
subject to tightened liability conditions. The inﬂuences within these con-
siderations which suggest tightened liability conditions for EU law are
considerably weaker in international law. A ﬁnal explanation is that tension
within domestic court hierarchies caused by Köbler liability are absent in the
international law context. The conclusion oﬀers some observations on whether
and how the international law experience might inform the development of
Köbler liability.
II. STATE RESPONSIBILITY FOR JUDICIAL DECISIONS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW
A. From Judicial Independence to State Unity
The shift in the underlying theory from judicial independence to state unity is
identiﬁed by Eduardo Jiménez de Aréchaga writing in 1978:7
The principles of the separation and independence of the judiciary in municipal
law and of respect for the ﬁnality of judicial decisions have exerted an important
6 ibid para 53.
7 E Jiménez de Aréchaga, International Law in the Past Third of a Century, 159-1 Recueil des
Cours (General Course in Public International Law, The Hague, 1978) 278. A similar formulation
of the three categories appears in an earlier contribution: E Jiménez de Aréchaga, ‘International
Responsibility of States for Acts of the Judiciary’, in W Friedmann, L Henkin and O Lissitzyn (eds)
Transnational Law in a Changing Society (Columbia University Press, New York, 1972) 171, 176.
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inﬂuence on the form in which the general principle of State responsibility has
been applied to acts or omissions of judicial organs. These basic tenets of judicial
organization explain the reluctance to be found in some arbitral awards of the last
century to admit the extension to the judiciary of the rule that a State is
responsible for the acts of all its organs. However, in the present century State
responsibility for acts of judicial organs came to be recognized. Although
independent of the Government, the judiciary is not independent of the State: the
judgment given by a judicial authority emanates from an organ of the State in just
the same way as a law promulgated by the legislature or a decision taken by the
executive.
Of more recent relevance is the International Law Commission’s Articles on
the Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts (‘Articles’).8 It is
clear from Article 4 that the conduct of state organs is attributed to the state in
an undiﬀerentiated manner.9 The commentary to the Articles explains that, this
approach reﬂects the treatment of the state ‘as a unity, consistent with its
recognition as a single legal person in international law’.10
B. A Dissenting View on Attribution of Judicial Conduct to the State
The separate opinion of Judge Tanaka in the Barcelona Traction case11 goes
very much against the tide. This may well be a large part of the explanation for
why it is rarely referred to, whether with disapproval or otherwise. However, as
the opinion emanates from the International Court of Justice, there is a danger
that it could be approached as setting out an uncontested perspective. The
following discussion therefore explains why the separate opinion is unconvin-
cing and why the shift in the underlying theory is normatively correct.
This was the only opinion which engaged with the merits of the case which
concerned the alleged responsibility of Spain toward Belgium due to various
acts and omissions of Spain’s judicial organs. Judge Tanaka was able to
proceed to the merits as he took a diﬀerent view from the majority of a
preliminary objection joined to the merits.12 When discussing the challenged
8 Available at <http://untreaty.un.org/ilc/texts/instruments/english/commentaries/9_6_2001.
pdf> . As noted in the ﬁrst paragraph of the opening General commentary, the Articles ‘seek to
formulate, by way of codiﬁcation and progressive development, the basic rules of international law
concerning the responsibility of States for their internationally wrongful acts’.
9 Article 4. Conduct of Organs of a State. 1. The conduct of any State organ shall be considered
an act of that State under international law, whether the organ exercises legislative, executive,
judicial or any other functions, whatever position it holds in the organization of the State, and
whatever its character as an organ of the central Government or of a territorial unit of the State.
[paragraph 2 omitted]
10 Para 6 of commentary to Article 2. See also para 5 of commentary to Article 4.
11 Case Concerning the Barcelona Traction, Light and Power Co. Ltd. (Belgium. v. Spain),
(Second Phase), (separate opinion of Judge Tanaka) ICJ Reports 1970, 114.
12 Unlike the majority, Judge Tanaka considered that the third preliminary objection was not
fatal to Belgium’s claim. Thus he considered that Belgium did have jus standi to protect Belgian
shareholders in the Canadian Barcelona Traction Company. Unlike the majority, Tanaka also
proceeded to consider, and dismissed, the fourth preliminary objection that the Belgian application
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judicial conduct, Judge Tanaka does not rely on unity of the state
considerations. His focus instead on judicial independence results in statements
very much at odds with the attribution rules now contained in the Articles. He
notes that ‘whether a State incurs responsibility or not depends on the concrete
circumstances of each case; in particular, the characteristics of the three kinds
of State activities—legislative, administrative and judicial—must be taken into
consideration. Mechanical, uniform treatment must be avoided.’13 Of course
the Articles deal with attribution in exactly such a mechanical and uniform
manner. Tanaka proceeds to note that:
. . . on the one hand, a State by reason of the independence of the judiciary, in
principle, is immune from responsibility concerning the activities of judicial
organs; this immunity, on the other hand, is not of an absolute nature. In certain
cases the State is responsible for the acts and omissions of judicial organs, namely
in cases where grave circumstances exist. That is the reason why denial of justice
is discussed by writers as a matter involving a State’s responsibility.14
It is clearly diﬃcult to reconcile Judge Tanaka’s views with the Articles and, in
any event, a further passage perhaps unintentionally obliterates his views on
the importance of judicial independence in the context of state responsibility,
and lends weight to the position on attribution described in the Articles.
The passage comes at the end of Judge Tanaka’s treatment of the nature of
judicial conduct which can, and cannot, amount to a denial of justice. His
treatment of this area would be generally accepted by commentators past and
present. Judge Tanaka begins by noting that the complaints raised by the
Belgian government related to the interpretation of municipal law and involved
matters ‘of an extremely complicated and technical nature’.15 The case is
therefore disposed of on its merits on the basis that erroneous interpretations of
municipal law do not, in themselves, result in a denial of justice. Such ‘issues
are of a municipal law nature’16 and were an international tribunal to take up
such issues it ‘would turn out to be a “cour de cassation”, the highest court in
the municipal law system.’17
Having established that the conduct complained of could not amount to a
denial of justice, Judge Tanaka proceeds, implicitly on an obiter basis, to
identify the types of decisions which can amount to a denial of justice and, in
so doing, introduces a latent contradiction.
A judgment of a municipal court which gives rise to the responsibility of a State
by a denial of justice does have an international character when, for instance, a
court, having occasion to apply some rule of international law, gives an incorrect
interpretation of that law or applies a rule of domestic law which is itself contrary
to international law. Apart from such exceptionally serious cases, erroneous and
was inadmissible by reason of the non-exhaustion of local remedies by the Barcelona Traction
Company. 13 Barcelona Traction (n 11) 153.
14 ibid 155–6. 15 ibid 156. 16 ibid 157. 17 ibid 158.
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unjust decisions of a court, in general, must be excluded from the concept of a
denial of justice.18 (emphasis added)
What can be questioned here is Judge Tanaka’s view of the judicial errors
described as ‘exceptionally serious’. On the contrary, a misinterpretation of a
rule of international law by a municipal court could be an entirely excusable
error when, for example, the meaning of the rule is unsettled at the time of the
decision. Judge Tanaka is entirely correct to regard such a mistake as capable
of incurring state responsibility. However, in doing so, he undermines his
previously expressed views on the dominant role of judicial independence
when deciding on state responsibility for judicial conduct. Independence
based considerations cannot result in a near complete immunity against state
responsibility, other than in the most serious of cases, while also having no
limiting eﬀect on state responsibility in the face of understandable and
excusable mistakes by judges.
The opinion can also be challenged on somewhat more general grounds.
It resonates with the objection in the Köbler case raised most strongly by
Austria, France and the United Kingdom that recognizing a principle of
state liability for judicial conduct would undermine the independence of
the judiciary. The argument is that judicial independence entails that the
government has no inﬂuence on reasoning and decision making in individual
cases.19 At ﬁrst sight, it is therefore perplexing how the government,
having surrendered the decision making to a constitutionally independent
institution, can be held to account for the errors of this institution. As Toner
comments, the objection (which she proceeds to dismiss) is that ‘[s]tate
liability identiﬁes the judiciary too closely with the government and
executive.’20
This perspective only works as a plausible objection by incorrectly
elevating judicial independence to the status of an end in itself. The sounder
approach is to regard judicial independence as a means to protect freedom
of judicial thought which, in turn, safeguards the sound administration of
justice. When this is appreciated, it becomes possible to turn on its head
the argument that state liability should be resisted by reason of judicial
independence. This is because the possibility of state liability provides a
deterrent against executive branch pressure to render decisions which are
contrary to international law obligations. This deterrent eﬀect can be thought of
as especially important in jurisdictions which favour absolute personal judicial
18 ibid.
19 ‘Institutional independence’ has been deﬁned as ‘duties to refrain from seeking, taking or
giving instructions. Judges cannot seek or take instructions from anyone, and this requires
particular sensitivity in relation to the executive where this is seen to be an acute and ever-present
danger’. See M Andenas and D Fairgrieve, ‘Judicial Independence and Accountability: National
Traditions and International Standards’ in G Canivet, M Andenas and D Fairgrieve (eds)
Independence, Accountability, and the Judiciary (BIICL, London, 2006) 23.
20 Toner (n 4) 169.
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immunity.21 Knowing that that they cannot be personally liable, judges could
be more amenable to government pressure. However, a principle of state
liability makes it less likely that governments will attempt to exert malign
inﬂuence towards non-compliance in the ﬁrst place. Objections to state liability
on independence based grounds therefore lack substance. Indeed, there is a
dissonance between the frequency with which independence based concerns
are raised and their inability to withstand scrutiny. In contrast, it is perfectly
understandable how states can be responsible for judicial mistakes which are
contrary to international law if the question of attribution is considered through
the lens of the state as a unity.
C. State Unity or Undiﬀerentiated Attribution as a Codiﬁcation
Despite the Separate Opinion discussed above, there is ample evidence that
Article 4 of the Articles is regarded as a codiﬁcation. Most of the cases involve
judicial decisions which reﬂect and reinforce the position of other state organs.
The ICJ Opinion in Diﬀerence Relating to Immunity from Legal Process of a
Special Rapporteur of the Commission on Human Rights22 is illustrative here.
Malaysia’s failure to provide immunity from legal process granted to experts
on mission arose from the executive branch failure to inform the courts of the
Secretary General’s ﬁnding of entitlement to immunity, and the trial court’s
subsequent failure to treat the matter of Mr Cumaraswamy’s immunity as a
preliminarily matter to be ‘expeditiously decided in limine litis’—at the start of
the procedure. Referring to what was then Article 6 of the Draft Articles on
State Responsibility (now Article 4), the Court noted that ‘the conduct of an
organ of a State—even an organ independent of the executive power—must be
regarded as an act of that State.’23 The same pattern and outcome is evident in
Lingens v Austria24 decided by the European Court of Human Rights. The case
involved Austrian court decisions imposing criminal penalties on the applicant
for defamation. The decisions were in harmony with the Austrian Criminal
Code and also defended by the government which referred to the need to
preserve discretion for judges to prevent political debate protected by freedom
of expression from degenerating into personal insult.25 Ahead of ﬁnding a
breach of Article 10, the Court’s response was that the margin of appreciation
aﬀorded to states to interpret the Convention ‘goes hand in hand with a
European supervision, embracing both the legislation and the decisions
applying it, even those given by an independent court’.26
21 In contrast to the absence of state liability for judicial decisions, some degree of personal
immunity is legitimately thought of as a means to protect freedom of judicial thought and,
therefore, the sound administration of justice. Olowofoyeku writes that it may undermine the
administration of justice if ‘instead of hearing parties abstractedly, a considerable portion of the
judge’s attention must be devoted to himself, i.e. the likelihood of liability if he reaches a particular
decision’. AA Olowofoyeku, Suing Judges: A Study of Judicial Immunity (OUP, Oxford,
1993) 191. 22 ICJ Reports 1999, 62. 23 ibid para 63.
24 (9815/82) (1986) 8 EHRR 407. 25 ibid para 37. 26 ibid para 39.
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In addition to these cases, Article 4 has also been applied in an
unquestioning manner in a case involving disunity between diﬀerent state
organs; speciﬁcally, a case in which the executive branch was actively engaged
in seeking the reversal of the oﬀending court decisions. The Brazil – Tyres27
case before a WTO panel and the Appellate Body involved an import ban on
used tyres found to be a quantitative restriction contrary to GATT Article XI.
Under the General Exceptions provided by Article XX, the import ban was
provisionally justiﬁed as being necessary to protect human health. This left the
question of whether the import ban complied with the chapeau of Article XX
which prohibits the application of measures in a manner which amounts to
‘arbitrary or unjustiﬁable discrimination between countries where the same
conditions prevail’. The application of the import ban had become incomplete
by reason of injunctions granted by Brazilian courts which prevented
enforcement of the ban by customs oﬃcials. These injunctions had been
obtained by ﬁrms in Brazil for whom imported used tyres were a cheap source
of raw material to be made into retreaded tyres. Both the panel and the
Appellate Body considered that the injunctions resulted in unjustiﬁable
discrimination in favour of Brazilian retreaders (since foreign retreaded tyres
could not be imported) contrary to the chapeau.
For present purposes, the main feature of case was the eﬀort of the executive
branch to seek the removal of the injunctions. The following extract from the
panel report was cited with approval by the Appellate Body:
We take note of the Brazilian government’s eﬀorts, within the Brazilian domestic
legal system, to prevent the grant, or seek reversal, of court injunctions for the
importation of used tyres. We also take note of the initiative taken in the course of
these proceedings to resolve the matter in a deﬁnitive manner through the
initiation of proceedings at the federal level. . .
While the Panel appreciates the practical diﬃculties that may be associated
with the prevention of such imports within Brazil’s domestic legal system, it is of
the view that it remains incumbent upon Brazil to ensure that it applies its
measure in a manner that is consistent with the requirements of Article XX. The
fact that the imports arise from court rulings does not exonerate Brazil from its
obligation to comply with the requirements of Article XX. Rather, as noted by the
Appellate Body in US – Shrimp, a Member of the WTO ‘bears responsibility for
acts of all its department of government, including its judiciary’.28 (notes omitted)
The fact that attribution of the judicial decisions was not presented by Brazil, or
analysed by the Appellate Body, as a contentious issue indicates that Article 4
is unequivocally accepted as a codiﬁcation. This is consistent with the state
unity theory which underpins the attribution principle. The theory looks at the
state from the outside and asks only whether the challenged conduct is that of a
27 WT/DS332 Brazil –Measures Aﬀecting Imports of Retreaded Tyres adopted 17 December
2007.
28 ibid paras 7.304–5. An omitted note at the end of para 7.305 cites Article 4 of the Articles.
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state organ. It does not matter if the internal reality is that the diﬀerent state
organs are in a condition of disunity.
In terms of the normative content of this position, it is also worth thinking
through the consequences of what would have happened had there been no
chapeau violation based on the non-attribution of the judicial conduct. The
executive branch would then have been less motivated to challenge the
injunctions through national court proceedings in order to remove the
violation. The decision therefore added urgency to the activity of the executive
branch as is shown by the arbitration on the reasonable period of time for
implementation which followed the Appellate Body ruling.29 Attribution of the
judicial conduct in this case therefore accelerated both GATT conformity
and the protection of human health and the environment. It is surely possible
to extrapolate that unconditional attribution enhances the observance of
international law in all cases.
D. State Unity or Undiﬀerentiated Attribution and Diﬀerentiation between
State Organs When Assessing Whether There Is a Violation
As is now evident, it is uncontroversial that the state unity theory results in
the attribution of the conduct of all state organs to the state without
diﬀerentiation. A more diﬃcult question is whether this non-diﬀerentiation at
the attribution stage also requires or implies non-diﬀerentiation at the
subsequent stage of deciding whether the conduct complained of amounts to
a violation.
The ILC Articles once again provide a useful starting point here in that a
clear separation of the two stages is envisaged:
As a normative operation, attribution must be clearly distinguished from the
characterization of conduct as internationally wrongful. Its concern is to establish
that there is an act of the State for the purposes of responsibility. To show that
conduct is attributable to the State says nothing, as such, about the legality or
otherwise of that conduct, and rules of attribution should not be formulated in
terms which imply otherwise.30
This passage explicitly provides that the matter of attribution has no bearing
upon whether the conduct complained of amounts to a violation. A possible
inference would be that attribution also has no bearing on the conditions under
which diﬀerent state organs can incur international responsibility. In other
29 This report notes that ‘the Government of Brazil asked the Federal Supreme Court to take note
of the WTO decision and to expedite its proceedings.’ WT/DS332/16 Arbitration under Article
21.3(c) of the DSU 29 August 2008 para 13.
30 Paragraph 4 of the opening Commentary to Chapter II on Attribution of Conduct to a State.
The importance of the distinction is indicated by the fact of its initial explanation in the very ﬁrst
paragraph of the opening General commentary.
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words, it is a possible inference that an undiﬀerentiated attribution rule and a
diﬀerentiated approach to liability can comfortably co-exist.
Contrary to this inference, it is argued that an undiﬀerentiated approach to
attribution strongly implies and in practice entails an undiﬀerentiated approach
to the conditions under which diﬀerent state organs incur international
responsibility. The most direct evidence for this claim is provided by a feature
of European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) jurisprudence. The ECtHR has
held that it need not specify which branch of the state is responsible for a
Convention breach—the sole issue being the state’s international responsi-
bility.31 It does not seem to be too much of a leap to suggest that this
undiﬀerentiated approach when deciding upon liability, is linked to the same
approach when attribution is considered.
As the general international law position is that any breach can incur state
responsibility, it can be expected that this position would apply to all state
organs. This expectation is evident when international tribunals review
national court decisions. The enquiry is whether a breach can be detected,
and the indications are that this criterion is applied in the same manner to all
state organs.32 As Paulsson notes:
A national court judgment violative of international law does not pose
any conceptual diﬃculty. There is no need to ﬁnd any exacerbated error,
contaminated by bad faith or by gross incompetence. There is no presumption of
compliance with international law. A simple error suﬃces. A simple diﬀerence of
opinion on the part of the international tribunal is enough; it has plenary powers to
rule on the alleged international wrong as it sees ﬁt.33
31 A statement to this eﬀect was made in Lingens v Austria (n 24) which concerned national
court decisions which faithfully applied the Austrian Criminal Code but which breached the
Convention. (para 46).
32 For example, in Lingens v Austria (n 24), the ECtHR showed no deference towards the
Austrian court decisions when evaluating whether they breached the applicant’s right to freedom of
expression. In Brazil – Tyres (n 27), a violation was conﬁrmed even though the national court
injunctions were not obviously and manifestly in breach of the chapeau of GATT Article XX. The
Appellate Body’s reasoning was based on an approach which it explicitly rejected in a previous
case so that the evolving nature of the Article XX jurisprudence could have been presented as a
consideration suggesting the excusable nature of the breach. On the development of the Appellate
Body’s reasoning, see A Davies, ‘Interpreting the Chapeau of GATT Article XX in Light of the
“New” Approach in Brazil – Tyres’ (2009) 43 JWTL 507.
33 Paulsson (n 3) 72. Some commentators would take issue with the reference in this passage to
the absence of a ‘presumption of compliance with international law’, operating on the international
law plane. Writing in 1972 Jiménez de Aréchaga states that ‘it is unanimously agreed that in this
subject there is one important presumption: that municipal judicial decisions are in conformity with
both municipal and international law.’ See Jiménez de Aréchaga, ‘International Responsibility of
States for Acts of the Judiciary’ (n 7) 182. A presumption in both areas would seem to be helpful in
terms of fostering cooperation between national and international courts and tribunals, albeit that
the presumption of compliance with municipal law is surely stronger than any presumption in
relation to international law. A presumption also signals that it is for the complaining state to
demonstrate violations.
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E. Conclusions on the International Law Position
The starting point when considering state liability for judicial conduct in
international law is now clearly the state unity theory. The theory requires that
judicial conduct is unconditionally attributed to the state. It also suggests that
the branch of the state from which the conduct emanates is immaterial when
addressing the formally separate question of whether the conduct complained
of amounts to a breach of an international law obligation. In practice therefore,
the conditions under which state responsibility can be incurred are the same for
all state organs, as is the application of these conditions.
On the other hand, the state unity theory is entirely neutral as to whether the
general state responsibility criteria are based on any breach (international law),
or only a suﬃciently serious breach (EU law). As indicated, the theory only
suggests that the general criteria (whatever they may be) should be applied in
the same manner to the judicial branch as other state organs. Therefore, to the
extent that there is a tightening of the general criteria in EU law for the judicial
branch, this represents something of a suppression of a natural implication of
the state unity theory.
III. STATE LIABILITY FOR JUDICIAL DECISIONS IN EU LAW
The ECJ ﬁrst recognized the possibility of Member State liability for decisions
of ﬁnal appeal courts contrary to EU law in the Köbler case of 2003.34 In doing
so, the ECJ drew upon the state unity theory,35 and went on to ﬁnd that the
objections raised by several Member States were not such as to outweigh
the need to aﬀord individuals the ‘possibility of rendering the State liable in
order . . . to obtain legal protection of their rights’.36 On the other hand, it was
also recognized that some weight should be given to some of the objections.
Therefore, when national courts hear state liability actions relating to judicial
decisions, they are permitted to apply the liability conditions in a particularly
34 The decision at issue was that of the Austrian Verwaltungsgerichtshof—the supreme
administrative court. Mr Köbler had been denied a special length of service increment for
university professors by the relevant Minister. While he had completed the required 15 years of
service, this had been in a number of Member States rather than exclusively in Austria as required
by the applicable salary law. The Minister’s decision was appealed to the Verwaltungsgerichtshof
claiming indirect discrimination contrary to the free movement of workers guaranteed by Article 45
TFEU (ex 39 TEU). Mr Köbler’s complaint was eventually dismissed by the
Verwaltungsgerichtshof based on its erroneous understanding of ECJ case law. There followed
an action for damages against Austria before the Landesgericht für Zivilrechtssachen Wien
(Regional Civil Court, Vienna) for breach of Community law by the Verwaltungsgerichtshof
judgment. The Regional Civil Court referred a series of questions. Based on the ECJ’s responses,
Mr Köbler’s claim was ultimately unsuccessful.
35 Quoting from its earlier judgment in Joined Cases C-46/93 and C-48/93 Brasserie du Pêcheur
and Factortame [1996] ECR I–1029, the Court in Köbler noted that ‘[i]n international law a State
which incurs liability for breach of an international commitment is viewed as a single entity,
irrespective of whether the breach which gave rise to the damage is attributable to the legislature,
the judiciary or the executive’ (para 33). 36 Köbler (n 5) paras 33–4.
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strict manner by reason of ‘the speciﬁc nature of the judicial function and . . . the
legitimate requirements of legal certainty’.37 To date, this has been evident in
the application of the suﬃciently serious breach test which was not satisﬁed in
Köbler itself. It was also not satisﬁed in Stephen Cooper v HM Attorney
General38 heard by the Court of Appeal inMay 2010 (discussed further below).
This section focuses on the extent of the permission for national courts to
apply the suﬃciently serious breach test in a strict manner in liability actions
involving court decisions, focusing on the Köbler twin requirements of ‘nature
of the judicial function’ and ‘legal certainty’.
A. The Nature of the Judicial Function
What did the ECJ mean when referring to ‘the speciﬁc nature of the judicial
function’? Since Köbler, this has been elaborated upon by the ECJ in Traghetti
del Mediterraneo SpA v Italy39 and by the UK courts in Cooper. In Traghetti,
the ECJ referred to the ‘very essence of judicial activity’ as being the
interpretation of legal provisions in response to ‘divergent or conﬂicting
arguments’.40 This was echoed by Arden LJ in Cooper:
Interpretation of Community legislation is part of the normal judicial function and
liability would no longer be exceptional if it could arise whenever the
interpretation was shown to be wrong – if only because the Court of Justice
often adopts an innovative interpretation or one motivated by policy insights that
would not be [sic] necessarily be available to the national court. There is in our
judgment no member state liability simply because the national court arrives at the
wrong answer: this is because ‘regard is [required to be] had to the speciﬁc nature
of the judicial function.’41 (emphasis added)
The emphasized term is crucial for it gives the passage its compatibility with
the ECJ’s position in Traghetti. The ECJ considered it ‘not inconceivable that a
manifest infringement of Community law might be committed precisely in the
exercise of such work of interpretation if, for example, the court gives a
substantive or procedural rule of Community law a manifestly incorrect
meaning, particularly in the light of the relevant case-law of the Court on the
subject . . .’. 42The sentiment that liability in these circumstances must
(however rare) be a legal possibility in Member States was recently reiterated
in Commission v Italy.43
37 ibid para 53.
38 [2010] EWCA Civ 464. This appears to be the only case to date subsequent to Köbler in
which the suﬃciently serious breach test has been addressed in the context of liability for judicial
decisions.
39 Case C–173/03 Traghetti del Mediterraneo SpA v Italy [2006] ECR I–5177.
40 ibid para 34. 41 Cooper (n 38) para 70. 42 Traghetti (n 39) para 35.
43 Case C–379/10, 24 November 2011. ‘48. Par conséquent, il convient de constater que: – en
excluant toute responsabilité de l’État italien pour les dommages causés à des particuliers du fait
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A query here is whether the ECJ intended to suggest that liability for court
decisions should be more exceptional than liability for the acts of other state
organs. The passages above describe the process by which the judicial branch
might reach a conclusion which is wrong as a matter of EU law. Other state
branches might reach the same wrong conclusion via the same process, but a
distinction can be conceded. Judges tend to reach wrong conclusions having
interpreted provisions of EU law in response to ‘divergent or conﬂicting
arguments’. In contrast, administrative oﬃcials sometimes reach wrong
conclusions in complete oversight of the EU law position. However, should
the process by which a wrong conclusion is reached be of relevance to the
prospects for establishing state liability?
It is submitted that process considerations are not directly relevant to the
question of whether decisions cross the threshold of being manifestly at odds
with EU law. This is because there is a single correct answer to this question,
unlike, for example, a decision made by a health board on whether to devote
scarce resources to purchase one drug or another. Here, the probity of the
choice which is made cannot be separated from the decision-making process
and it would clearly be a problem if the interests of one set of patients had been
ignored.
In contrast, when deciding whether there is a suﬃciently serious breach, the
decision-making process is only indirectly relevant for evidential purposes. A
process which engages with the EU law position is likely to be useful when
determining whether the error was excusable or inexcusable for it might well
reveal where, and how, the decision maker committed the error. However, the
error is neither excusable nor inexcusable directly by reason of the process.
Similarly, it is not possible to conclude from a grossly deﬁcient process
whether the decision is manifestly at odds with EU law. Indeed, such a process
could fortuitously result in the correct decision.
A possible response is that legal issues which are litigated tend to be more
ﬁnely balanced than those which are not so that errors in the judicial process
are more likely to be excusable than those in administrative decision-making.
This argument is persuasive only when the origin of the Köbler liability action
is a judicial decision. However, the Köbler case itself originated in the decision
of a Minister while the Cooper case originated in a planning decision of a
London council. Therefore, in both cases, the question of what was required as
a matter of EU law would have been, or ought to have been, considered by an
d’une violation du droit de l’Union commise par une juridiction nationale statuant en dernier
ressort, lorsque cette violation résulte d’une interprétation des règles de droit ou d’une appréciation
des faits et des preuves eﬀectuée par cette juridiction, et – en limitant cette responsabilité aux seuls
cas du dol ou de la faute grave, conformément à l’article 2, paragraphes 1 et 2, de la loi n°117/88, la
République italienne a manqué aux obligations qui lui incombent en vertu du principe général de
responsabilité des États membres pour violation du droit de l’Union par l’une de leurs juridictions
statuant en dernier ressort.’
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executive/administrative oﬃcial. This question did not become more diﬃcult
when it was brought before a national court of ﬁnal appeal.
It follows that, for all state branches, if the reach and scope of the EU law
norm is unclear at the time of the decision, state liability is unlikely to ensue.
On the other hand, if the territory within which discretion or judgment can be
exercised has already been constrained by clarifying decisions of the ECJ, state
liability becomes more likely. Additionally, if regard to the origin of the
challenged decision were to enter this exercise, this could even be depicted as
disadvantageous to the judicial branch. A higher level of awareness and
understanding of the ECJ’s case law can arguably be expected of national
courts of ﬁnal appeal than any other part of the state.
Therefore, it is not clear that the nature of the judicial function provides a
rationale for regarding wrong decisions of the judicial branch as a more
exceptional basis for state liability than wrong decisions of other state
branches. However, as the ECJ noted, regard must also be had to the
‘legitimate requirements of legal certainty’, which may be a stronger basis.
B. Legal Certainty
The need to protect the authority of res judicata44 was foremost among the
reasons presented by Member States for either not recognizing state liability at
all, or only subject to restrictive conditions. Austria, for example, seemed to
appeal to the public policy dimension of the res judicata principle which
identiﬁes the public interest in bringing an end to litigation. It considered that
‘a re-examination of the legal appraisal by a court adjudicating at last instance
would be incompatible with the function of such a court since the purpose of its
decisions is to bring a dispute to a deﬁnitive conclusion.’45
Both the ECJ and Advocate General Léger discarded this position as an
objection to the principle of state liability. In the Advocate General’s words
‘the legal authority of a judicial decision—and, as a consequence, res judicata
—is applicable only in certain circumstances, where there is a threefold
identity—of subject-matter, legal basis and parties—between a dispute already
resolved and a subsequent dispute’.46 The ECJ referred more generally to the
‘purpose’ of the proceedings being compared and the ‘parties’47 and it can be
seen how there is an appreciable diﬀerence between the initial judicial review
44 The term Res judicata pro veritate habetur was deﬁned by Advocate General Léger as ‘a
matter adjudicated is held to be true’. Köbler (n 5) point 96.
45 ibid point 21.
46 ibid point 101. On the ‘triple-identity’ criteria, a report of the International Law Association
notes that ‘the [res judicata] doctrine undoubtedly applies in all principal legal systems to prevent
the same claimant bringing the same claim against the exact same respondent.’ International Law
Association ‘Interim Report: Res Judicata and Arbitration’ Berlin Conference 2004, 3.
47 ibid para 39.
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against the decision of the Minister in order to obtain the increment, and the
later action for damages against the state.
In dismissing res judicata based concerns as a bar to the possibility of state
liability, the ECJ might also have referred to the private justice rationale which
accompanies the public policy dimension. This is to prevent an individual from
being proceeded against twice for the same cause,48 or, as Briza notes, the
‘main thrust’ of res judicata is legal certainty for private individuals.49 The
ECJ might therefore have observed that to deny the possibility of state liability
would be to protect the ﬁnality of judgments for the beneﬁt of the state, rather
than individuals. However, even without this point, the ECJ noted that ‘the
principle of res judicata does not preclude recognition of the principle of State
liability for the decision of a court adjudicating at last instance.’50
Of course, this conclusion does not mean that legal certainty based concerns
are completely immaterial in Köbler liability actions. A judgment will only in
strict terms have the force of res judicata in subsequent proceedings when all
three of the ‘triple-identity’ criteria are satisﬁed. However, the related matter of
whether the second proceeding compromises legal certainty is a question of
degree so that certainty will tend to be signiﬁcantly compromised when the res
judicata criteria come very close to being satisﬁed.51 While the two national
proceedings in Köbler were appreciably diﬀerent, they were also closely
related. In general terms, the question at the heart of both cases related to the
EU law compatibility of the Austrian condition for the award of the increment.
Like Groussot and Minssen,52 I would also therefore endorse the assessment of
Tridimas that,
The real issue is not whether those principles [ﬁnality of judgements and res
judicata] are undermined but whether such undermining eﬀect is outweighed by
the need to ensure respect for the rule of law and the eﬀectiveness of EC law
which liability for judicial acts is intended to serve.53
In sum, legal certainty based concerns are more convincing than regard for the
nature of the judicial function, as a basis for a strict approach towards liability
for ﬁnal appeal-court decisions. Additionally, it is perhaps not far-fetched to
suppose that national courts hearing Köbler liability actions are likely to detect
and use the permission as long as there is scope for them to do so.
48 ILA report (n 46) 3.
49 P Briza, ‘Lucchini SpA – is There Anything Left of Res Judicata Principle?’ (2008) 27
CJQ 44. 50 Köbler (n 5) para 40.
51 This matter is discussed more fully in Section IV, A.
52 X Groussot and T Minssen, ‘Res Judicata in the Court of Justice Case-Law: Balancing Legal
Certainty with Legality?’ (2007) 3 EurConstLRev 395.
53 T Tridimas, General Principles of EU Law (OUP, Oxford, 2006) 528.
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IV. EXPLAINING THE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN THE COMMUNITY AND INTERNATIONAL
LAW POSITIONS
In EU law, the possibility of establishing liability is constrained by the
permission to apply the suﬃciently serious breach test in an especially strict
manner in respect of judicial decisions. In my view, this means that the
conditions for Köbler liability permit the theory of state unity to be balanced
against other considerations. This exercise does not occur in international law
where the conditions for state responsibility are the same for all state organs.
What are the possible explanations for the more limited conception of the state
unity theory in EU law?
A. Res Judicata Concerns
As discussed in the previous section, res judicata concerns provide a valid
reason for a diﬀerentiated approach to liability for judicial decisions in EU law.
Are these concerns less pronounced in the international law context?
Advocate General Léger’s statement of when the res judicata principle is at
its strongest can be recalled. This occurs ‘where there is a threefold identity—
of subject-matter, legal basis and parties—between a dispute already resolved
and a subsequent dispute’. Based on these criteria, it is submitted that the most
sensitive point which implicates res judicata in the Köbler scenario is that the
challenged ﬁnal appeal court decision will have (or at least ought to have)
considered whether the national measure at issue is consistent with EU law. In
the event of a positive answer, the same question is considered for a second
time. Signiﬁcantly, the re-consideration is by a national court, albeit that it may
make a reference to the ECJ. This re-consideration creates strong identity of
subject matter and also somewhat blurs the division of legal basis since the
remedy in both cases will depend on an EU law dimension.
This sequence only carries over to the international law context when certain
conditions are present, such as that the state in question has a monist tradition
and the Treaty provisions at issue are of an appropriate nature, and suﬃciently
precise, to be applied directly, or that the Treaty has been incorporated. Absent
these conditions, the ﬁrst occasion on which the consistency of the national
measure with international law is considered will be before the international
court or tribunal.
Looking at the criterion of ‘identity of parties’, there is continuity in the
complainant’s identity in Köbler actions. Classically, the state is the
complainant in international law matters, as opposed to individuals who may
have unsuccessfully sought redress at the national level.54 This is not always so
for there will be continuity, for example, when an investor brings a denial of
justice claim before an international tribunal having been dissatisﬁed with the
54 For a brief account of the gradual erosion of this view, see Paulsson (n 3) 53–6.
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conduct of a hearing before a national court, and having exhausted local
remedies. The process of exhausting local remedies would likely create identity
of subject matter since the alleged failure in the administration of justice would
be appealed within the domestic system. However, there would not be identity
of legal basis since the international tribunal would be the ﬁrst to hear the claim
of alleged breach of the international law delict of denial of justice.
On the other hand, there are situations in which continuity in all three
elements could be present in the international law context, thereby strongly
implicating res judicata concerns. This can occur in claims relating to the
European Convention on Human Rights, by reason of the combination of
Article 13 which requires the availability of ‘an eﬀective remedy before a
national authority’ for those with an arguable claim that their Convention rights
and freedoms have been violated, Article 34 which envisages individual
applications to the ECtHR, and Article 35 which ﬁrst requires the exhaustion of
local remedies. Suppose that an individual wishes to challenge conduct of the
executive branch which arguably violates the Convention. Using judicial
review processes which satisfy Article 13, the highest national court to which
the matter can be appealed decides that the executive branch has not violated
the Convention. Having thus exhausted local remedies under Article 35, the
applicant then relies on Article 34 in order to bring the case before the ECtHR
arguing again that the executive branch conduct violates the Convention.
Should the ECtHR hear the case, there could well be identity of subject matter,
legal basis55 and parties.
However, there is no evidence that res judicata based concerns are raised in
cases which correspond with this scenario, even though they have involved the
House of Lords denying alleged Convention violations which were later found
to be present by the ECtHR.56 The strongest explanation is that dispute
settlement organs at the international level are considered only to be bound by
decisions at the same level, and not also by decisions of national courts.57
This explanation is generally thought to be a corollary of the triple-identity
criteria.58 The domestic decision is not binding because one or more of these
55 Whether identity of legal basis would be present depends on whether the applicant was
relying directly on the Convention at the national level. Identity of legal basis would also come
close to being satisﬁed if the applicant was relying on a domestic instrument of incorporation. A
leading work notes that ‘[a]ll states parties have incorporated the Convention in one form or
another, but this has not been through any legal obligation derived from Article 13 or the
Convention generally.’ The authors further note ECtHR case law to the eﬀect that there is no
requirement that the Convention be capable of being relied upon directly in domestic courts, the
lesser requirement under Article 13 being ‘the possibility of canvassing the substance of the
Convention argument before a national authority’. DJ Harris, M O’ Boyle and C Warbrick, Law of
the European Convention on Human Rights (2nd edn, OUP, Oxford, 2009) 558–9 and 562.
56 Recent cases involving the UK include,Marper v UK (30562/04) (2009) 48 EHRR 50;Gillan
and Quinton v UK (4158/05) (2010) 50 EHRR 45.
57 See ILA Report on Res Judicata and Arbitration (n 46) 18–19.
58 Brownlie states that: ‘There is no eﬀect of res judicata from the decision of a municipal court
so far as an international jurisdiction is concerned, since, although the subject matter may be
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criteria tend not to be fulﬁlled when the case transitions to the international
level. However, the non-binding nature of the domestic decision before the
international tribunal surely also has normative force even if the triple-identity
criteria are fulﬁlled. Res judicata concerns ought not to provide a defence to a
state whose courts have infringed international law obligations. They are
outweighed by the power of the international tribunal to rule on the alleged
wrong. The true rationale for the absence of res judicata concerns might
therefore rest in the transition from one level of adjudication (national) to
another (ECtHR) and a robust conception of state unity at the second level.
Here, there is no concession to the branch of the state from which the alleged
violation emanates.
The signiﬁcance of this transition can be reinforced by considering the
impact of a change in the noted scenario. The starting point is the same with the
highest national court to which the matter can be appealed having conﬁrmed
that the executive branch has not violated the Convention. One might then
question whether the applicant might once again rely on Article 13 to challenge
the substance of the national court judgment as a possible Convention
violation, rather than commencing proceedings before the ECtHR. There is
presently no deﬁnite answer in ECtHR case law on whether Article 13 is
generally applicable in this situation,59 although it has been argued (partly by
analogy with Köbler liability) that Article 13 ought to apply generally to acts or
omissions by the judiciary which lead to violations of ECHR obligations.60
When such questions come before the ECtHR, it is surely foreseeable that
states will raise res judicata based objections. That these objections could be
dismissed does not matter. Rather, the point is that res judicata will very
probably be raised and discussed if Article 13 is to operate to delay, or render
unnecessary, recourse to the ECtHR. This discussion will occur by reason of
the retention of the dispute within the same level of adjudication.
In sum, res judicata based concerns are always strongly implicated in
Köbler liability cases since they involve a re-consideration, within the same
judicial order, and at the request of the same complainant, of the EU law
compatibility of a national rule. In contrast, res judicata concerns can be
depicted as applying to varying degrees in diﬀerent international law contexts.
The greater the extent to which the international law context in question departs
substantially the same, the parties will not be, and the issues will have a very diﬀerent aspect. In the
municipal court the legal person claiming is an individual or corporation: before an international
tribunal the claimant will be a state exercising diplomatic protection with respect to its nationals.’ I
Brownlie, Principles of Public International Law (6th edn, OUP, Oxford, 2003) 50.
59 To date, the ECtHR has not interpreted Article 13 as applying generally to all possible
violations committed by the judicial branch. It has only so far been interpreted as applying to
violations by the judiciary of the ‘hearing within a reasonable time’ requirement of Article 6(1).
Kudla v Poland (30210/96) (2002) 35 EHRR 11.
60 T Barkhuysen and ML van Emmerik, ‘Accountability of the Judiciary on the National Level
for Violations of the European Convention on Human Rights’ in Canivet, Andenas and Fairgrieve
(eds) (n 19) 419.
602 International and Comparative Law Quarterly
from the classical model of international law as being clearly separated from
national law and as involving relations between states, the more pronounced
res judicata concerns become. However, all international law contexts share
the common feature of a transition between diﬀerent levels of adjudication. It
appears to be accepted that res judicata based concerns do not outweigh the
power of the international tribunal to rule on the alleged wrong. The balance
settles at a diﬀerent point in Köbler liability actions. Here res judicata concerns
have more weight because the dispute is retained within the national level of
adjudication.
B. Köbler Liability as an Aspect of EU Integration
It is axiomatic that the EU has integration objectives which are not shared by
any regime of international law. In the present context, this diﬀerence exerts
two inﬂuences which pull in opposing directions. First, it would have been
astonishing if Köbler liability had not been recognized bearing in mind that
whole-state liability is an established international law feature. Secondly,
however, it would also have been surprising if Köbler liability had been
recognized without any tightening of liability conditions. This is because, in
order for EU integration to be successful, it must occur with reference to the
legal traditions of the Member States.61 Neither the Court nor the Advocate
General pointed towards a clear example of a jurisdiction which recognizes all
the elements of Köbler liability—state liability for mistaken judgments of
national courts of ﬁnal appeal.62 While Member States were told that all these
elements have to be recognized in cases with an EU law dimension, there was a
need for an accommodation. The tightened liability conditions could therefore
be viewed as a concession to national legal orders, and as intended to enhance
61 Analytical tools are therefore required to mediate between national legal orders and possible
EU law developments. In this regard, reference was made by the Advocate General to the
established distinction between the ‘rule’ to be recognized, and the ‘scope and the conditions of
application’ of the rule (point 85). The rule need not be a feature of all Member State legal systems
and the fact that the scope and the conditions for applying the rule vary from one Member State to
another has no inﬂuence. When applying these principles there is considerable scope for ﬂexibility
as there is only a hazy distinction between the rule, and its scope and conditions for application.
However, the fact of engagement with national law traditions is arguably more signiﬁcant than the
extent to which the process has a true braking eﬀect on the development of EU law. There is at least
a conscious eﬀort to relate the EU law development with something comparable which is
recognized by some Member States.
62 The Advocate General noted that ‘Belgium is the only Member State which has
acknowledged, in its case-law, the general principle of the liability of the State for the actions of
its courts’ (point 83). The missing element here is that the Cour de Cassation was not discussing its
own liability as a court of ﬁnal appeal, but that of a court lower in the hierarchy. Other Member
States are a good deal further away from recognizing all the required elements. For example, under
Austrian law, state liability for the decisions of its supreme courts is excluded by statute under art 2
(3) of the Amtshaftungsgesetz – Public Tort Liability Act (Bundesgesetzblatt No 20/1949). In the
UK, section 2(5) of the Crown Proceedings Act 1947 excludes proceedings against the Crown ‘in
respect of anything done or omitted to be done by any person while discharging or purporting to
discharge any responsibility of a judicial nature vested in him’.
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the prospects for embedding Köbler liability as an aspect of European
integration.
In contrast, when international tribunals address state liability for judicial
decisions, there is less need to think about any process of integration and
prevailing national law traditions. To a much greater extent than the EU legal
system, international law operates above and apart from municipal legal
systems. The state unity theory is therefore permitted to result in undiﬀer-
entiated liability conditions.
B. Judicial Cooperation in Community Law and International Law
More than the ECJ, Advocate General Léger devoted considerable attention to
establishing that national supreme courts play a vital role in the implemen-
tation, enforcement and development of EU law.63 He referred to the
‘progressive development of a real Community judicial ethic’64 and identiﬁes
‘the leading role played by supreme courts in the application of Community
law’65 as evidenced by the obligation upon them to refer questions for
preliminary rulings under Article 267.66 These considerations led the Advocate
General to conclude that ‘[i]t is impossible to see how a Member State could
prima facie escape all liability for the acts or omissions of its supreme courts
when, speciﬁcally, those courts are responsible for applying and ensuring
compliance with Community law. That would amount to an insuperable
paradox.’67
There is also another paradox here. The very considerations which require
the possibility of state liability for judicial conduct also suggest that the actual
imposition of liability should be rare. Since, the ‘Community judicial ethic’
between the ECJ and national courts is the very foundation of the EU legal
order,68 the possibility of consequences must attach to the breakdown of this
ethic in individual cases. However, this ethic depends on a spirit of collegiality
between Community and national judicial organs.69 The problem is that
63 Köbler (n 5) points 53–76. 64 ibid point 53. 65 ibid point 71.
66 ibid point 74.
67 ibid point 70. In the same manner, the ECJ (para 34) noted that since a decision of a court
adjudicating at last instance ‘cannot thereafter be corrected, individuals cannot be deprived of the
possibility of rendering the State liable in order in that way to obtain legal protection of their
rights’.
68 See K Alter, Establishing the Supremacy of European Law: The Making of an International
Rule of Law in Europe (OUP, Oxford, 2001). Alter indicates that the ECJ has generally enjoyed a
more harmonious relationship with lower national courts than supreme national courts. Lower
courts have tended to view the preliminary ruling procedure as a means of expanding their authority
within the national legal system while supreme courts view the same procedure as capable of
undermining their authority and responsibility to maintain the coherence of the national legal
system. See Alter’s discussion of a general theory of judicial interests at 45–52.
69 This spirit of collegiality is captured in diﬀerent terms by Anne-Marie Slaughter who
describes a ‘community of courts’ within which each ‘is a check on the other, but not a decisive
one, asserting their respective claims through dialogue of incremental decisions signalling
opposition or cooperation’. A-M Slaughter, ‘Judicial Globalization’ (2000) 40 VaJIntlL 1108.
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actually imposing state liability is more akin to a hierarchical structure,
something which has been strongly resisted by several national supreme courts
particularly the German Federal Constitutional Court.70 The paradox is
therefore that state liability both underlines and undermines the ‘Community
judicial ethic’. The riposte that the damages action is heard by a national court
is not a complete answer if the lower court hearing the damages action seeks
guidance from the ECJ. The way in which Köbler was decided may well have
had more to do with this unarticulated consideration than the considerations
discussed above.71 Indeed, it is even arguable that the ECJ intended to send a
signal to future litigants. If it is more diﬃcult to establish state liability for
judicial conduct, litigants are more likely to frame their damages action as a
challenge against legislative and administrative shortcomings.72 This reduces
tension between the Court and national supreme courts.
Before turning to the international law context, a possible view that the
tightening of the liability conditions has little to do with judicial cooperation
can be addressed. This view could be based upon the ECJ’s approach in Article
258 enforcement actions relating to judicial decisions. If cooperation is among
the explanations for a tightening of the conditions of liability in Köbler actions,
a comparable tightening should be observable in this analogous context.
Looking at the leading case, it is indeed diﬃcult to identify any tightening of
the liability conditions. However, it is also clear from the ECJ’s conclusion that
the infringement was not ultimately based directly upon the supreme court
decisions:
. . . it must be declared that, by failing to amend art. 29(2) of Law No. 428/1990,
which is construed and applied by the administrative authorities and a substantial
proportion of the courts, including the Corte suprema di cassazione, in such a
way that the exercise of the right to repayment of charges levied in breach of
Community rules is made excessively diﬃcult for the taxpayer, Italy has failed to
fulﬁl its obligations under the EC Treaty.73
70 Slaughter refers to this court’s ‘long history of engaging and challenging the ECJ as a co-
equal rather than a superior court’ (at 1107). Alter’s chapter on German Judicial Acceptance of
European Law Supremacy could be described as a full exposition of this theme. Alter (n 68)
chapter 3. See also B Zwingmann, ’ The Continuing Myth of Euroscepticism? The German Federal
Constitutional Court Two Years after Lisbon’, this volume.
71 This is indicated by one of the earliest recognitions of the link between state liability for
judicial conduct and undermining the cooperative relationship between national and Community
courts. In a widely cited footnote, it is signiﬁcant that Steiner was referring to this problem as a
reason for regarding even the possibility of state liability for judicial failure as ‘unthinkable’. It is
entirely possible therefore that, having recognized the unthinkable, the Court was very mindful of
cooperation concerns in setting the conditions. J Steiner, ‘From Direct Eﬀect to Francovich:
Shifting Means of Enforcement of EC Law’ (1993) 18 EL Rev 11 at n 48.
72 Mr Köbler might himself have elected to challenge in the damages action either the national
measure itself or its application by the relevant Minister.
73 Case C–129/00 Commission of the European Communities v Italy [2003] ECR I–14637
para 41.
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It is submitted that, in enforcement proceedings, it will usually be possible for
the ECJ to base liability on such a failure to correct a judicial interpretation,
rather than directly on the judicial decisions. This is because enforcement
proceedings are only likely to be brought against established judicial
interpretations rather than isolated judgments. As for why the ECJ chose to
express its conclusion in this way, the need to preserve judicial cooperation is a
possible explanation.
What can be said of the international context by way of comparison? Here,
there is growing awareness of the beneﬁts of various forms of interaction and
cooperation among national judges and between national and international
tribunals.74 A core aspect of the debate has been the role of national courts in
enhancing the salience and impact of international law.75 Building on the
work of Anne-Marie Slaughter, Benvenisti and Downs have recently posited
collaboration between national and international tribunals as an essential
means of enabling ‘global governance to ﬂourish’, of ‘creating a more coherent
international regulatory system’ and ‘modestly defragmenting the present
system’.76 Yet it is probably not controversial to suggest that this is an area in
which normative aspirations are running ahead of what can be observed. Thus,
in response to Benvenisti and Downs, Lavranos adds a note of caution by
referring to ‘a sliding scale of the direct impact of judgments of diﬀerent
international courts on national courts, the ECJ being at the top of this scale,
followed by the ECtHR, and the ICJ at the bottom’.77 On the economic side,
the decisions of WTO panels and the Appellate Body ought probably to be
located closer to the bottom of this scale than the top. This is much as one
would expect bearing in mind that implementing measures, at least in the US
and the EU, expressly precludes private party reliance on WTO law.78 On the
other hand, US courts have expressly recognized that panel and Appellate
Body pronouncements are of persuasive value in the process of seeking to
interpret ambiguous domestic legislation consistently with WTO obligations.79
In the EU context, Bronckers has referred to a number of cases in which a
74 See Slaughter (n 68); A-M Slaughter, ‘A Global Community of Courts’ (2003) 44 HarvIntlLJ
191 (2003); and M Amos, ‘The dialogue between United Kingdom courts and the European Court
of Human Rights’, this volume.
75 For a recent contribution to this area, see A Roberts, ‘Comparative International Law? The
Role of National Courts in Creating and Enforcing International Law’ (2011) 60 ICLQ 57.
76 E Benvenisti and G Downs, ‘National Courts, Domestic Democracy, and the Evolution of
International Law’ (2009) 20 EJIL 69–70.
77 N Lavranos, ‘National Courts, Domestic Democracy, and the Evolution of International Law:
A Reply to Eyal Benvenisti and George Downs’ (2010) 21 EJIL 1108 (notes omitted).
78 In the US, see the Uruguay Round Agreements Act, section 102(c)(1)(A)–(B). In the EU, see
the last recital of the Preamble of the Council Decision of 22 December 1994 concerning the
conclusion on behalf of the European Union, as regards matters within its competence, of the
agreements reached in the Uruguay Round of multilateral negotiations (1986–1994), [I994] OJ L
336/1 of 23 December 1994.
79 On the case law here, see G Gattinara, ‘The Relevance of WTO Dispute Settlement Decisions
in the US Legal Order’ (2009) 36 Legal Issues Economic Integration 285.
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reasonable assumption could be made that the ECJ was partly motivated by an
inclination to avoid conﬂict with Appellate Body rulings.80 He sees these cases
as evidence of a ‘muted dialogue’ between the ECJ and the Appellate Body,
contrasting this with a much more open dialogue between the ECJ and the
ECtHR.
Judicial cooperation is clearly not something which is conﬁned to the
relationship between the ECJ and national courts. Yet, cooperation in the EU
legal order is likely to retain a more developed and consistent quality than
anything which can be observed in any international law setting by reason
of the supremacy and direct eﬀect of EU law coupled with the preliminary
ruling procedure.81 This has a bearing upon the conditions for state liability in
respect of judicial conduct. It is potentially damaging to the interaction
between the ECJ and national supreme courts for the ECJ to adjudicate on the
substance of national court judgments. Limiting state liability (in eﬀect) to
cases where it can be reasonably inferred that the national court has been either
incompetent in failing to understand the EU law dimension of a case, or has
deliberately ignored this dimension, can be seen as a means of reducing this
tension. For the most part, while state liability is present in the background, it is
not imposed, thereby preserving the more subtle system of signalling
cooperation or opposition which one would expect within a community of
courts. Hence, in EU law, the tests for state liability in respect of judicial
decisions can permissibly be applied in an especially strict manner. At least in
relative terms, it is a less sensitive matter for an international court to adjudicate
on whether national court judgments comply with international law. There is
less of a community of courts whose ethos is capable of being damaged by the
imposition of state liability.
C. Internal Tensions Caused by Köbler Liability Are Absent in the
International Law Context
A number of Member States in Köbler objected to the possibility of state
liability on the basis that it would cause internal tensions which have been well
described by Anagnostaras. He sees state responsibility here as ‘entrusting the
determination of the breach to a body belonging to the same system as the
wrongdoer’. The lower court judge may ‘hesitate to reproach’ the activity of a
superior court and, if the damages action is appealed to the supreme court, he
questions ‘whether there is any point at all in accepting the availability of a
80 M Bronckers, ‘From “Direct Eﬀect” to “Muted Dialogue” Recent Developments in the
European Courts’ Case Law on the WTO and Beyond’ (2008) 11 JIEL 889–90.
81 Mancini and Keeling evoke the image of the doctrines of direct eﬀect and supremacy as the
‘twin pillars of the EU’s legal system’ and the preliminary reference procedure as the ‘keystone in
the ediﬁce; without [which] the roof would collapse and the two pillars would be left as a desolate
ruin’. GF Mancini and DT Keeling, ‘From CILFIT to ERT: The Constitutional Challenge Facing
the European Court’ (1991) 11 YB EurL 2–3.
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damages action under circumstances permitting the alleged wrongdoer simply
to conﬁrm the legality of its contested action and to dismiss the relevant
claim’.82 Such concerns can be downplayed. As Advocate General Léger
pointed out, the preliminary ruling makes it possible to ‘dispel any reasonable
doubt as to the impartiality of the national court’.83 However, it may now seem
as though Anagnostaras’ perspective was remarkably prescient in light of the
litigation in Cooper.84 In this case, Köbler liability was considered by the High
Court in respect of a Court of Appeal decision. The High Court did not make a
reference and neither did the Court of Appeal before conﬁrming the legality of
its own previous judgments.85 Concerns about internal tensions and lack of
impartiality may therefore emerge to be well founded as the national reception
of Köbler liability is tested in future cases.
In this eventuality, the burden on the applicant of satisfying stringent tests
which can be strictly applied can be seen as a means of defusing this tension.
Some internal tension may be caused by the national court merely hearing the
action. However, the occurrence which causes the most tension—conﬁrmation
of state liability—will be highly exceptional by reason of the permission to
apply the key test in a strict manner. In the international law context, the
obvious diﬀerence is that state responsibility is evaluated and imposed by
judicial bodies and tribunals which are external to the national court system so
that the need to minimize internal tensions clearly does not apply. The
externality of the international judicial body means that it can evaluate and
impose state responsibility in a relatively uninhibited manner compared with a
national court.
82 Anagnostaras (n 4) 290–1, 295–6. 83 Köbler (n 5) point 111.
84 The eventual state liability action originated from planning decisions of a London council in
connection with the White City Development. Judicial review of these decisions was
unsuccessfully sought by The Council for the Protection of Rural England (CPRE) on the basis
that procedures required by the Environmental Impact Assessment Directive had not been
followed. The Court of Appeal decisions which exonerated the council’s actions were challenged in
the liability action by Mr Cooper who was a trustee of the London branch of CPRE. Mr Cooper
claimed that the decisions met all the conditions for Köbler liability and caused him loss in the form
of adverse orders for costs.
85 Upon closer examination, however, it is not so clear that the case is a good example of the
problems described. As for why neither the High Court nor the Court of Appeal made a reference, it
is suggested that, on the suﬃciently serious breach requirement, the case was nowhere near as close
to the threshold as Köbler. Pivotal in the liability action was the meaning of ‘development consent’
in the Environmental Impact Assessment Directive. At the time of the decisions which exonerated
the council’s actions, the Court of Appeal had considered the meaning of this term to be acte clair.
Foremost among the reasons was that the Court of Appeal’s understanding of the term was not at
odds with the Commission’s understanding (para 112). The Court of Appeal’s understanding also
appeared to be consistent with the text of the Directive, up to ECJ judgments which post-dated the
impugned decisions. At ﬁrst instance in the liability action, Plender, J warned against comparing
‘the gravity of error made by one court with that of another’. ([2008] EWHC 2178 (QB) para 55)
However, I would hazard that the ECJ in Köbler forgave far more of the Verwaltungsgerichtshof
than the Court of Appeal did of itself in Cooper. A further point is that the Court of Appeal was
only sitting as the court of last instance when it reached the decisions which were later challenged
in the liability action, rather than also in the liability action itself. Therefore, the Court of Appeal
did not have the last say in conﬁrming the legality of its own contested action.
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V. CONCLUSION
This article has had the twofold aim of establishing and explaining a signiﬁcant
diﬀerence with respect to state liability for judicial decisions in international
and EU law. In international law, the judicial origin of challenged decisions
does not inﬂuence the content of the liability criterion or its application,
whereas, in EU law, the liability criteria can be applied to judicial decisions in a
tightened manner.
Both in establishing and explaining this diﬀerence, much has depended upon
an assessment of the proper meaning, strict requirements, and implications of
the relevant ideas and principles. Foremost here has been the state unity theory
which provides the basis for whole-state liability and which has supplanted the
constitutionally independent status of the judicial branch as the dominant
consideration. This is a reassuring development since freedom of judicial
thought, as the value protected by the separation of the judicial branch, is better
protected by the possibility of state liability for judicial decisions. More
contentiously, a question has been raised about the conventional understanding
of state unity that its inﬂuence begins and ends with the matter of attribution.
The suggestion is that undiﬀerentiated attribution implies undiﬀerentiated
liability conditions in content and application for all state organs, and that this
would appear to be reﬂected in an established feature of ECtHR case law. On
this basis, the article has depicted the international system as giving eﬀect to
both the strict requirement of the state unity theory, and a natural implication
ﬂowing from the theory.
In contrast, EU law gives eﬀect only to the strict requirement, at least to
the extent that Member State courts hearing Köbler liability actions are
permitted to apply the liability criteria in a tightened manner. As to the
existence and extent of this permission, it is again a matter of assessing
the relevant ideas and principles. Despite some clariﬁcation of the nature of
the judicial function in the post-Köbler case law, this consideration does
not appear to withstand scrutiny as a rationale for a diﬀerentiated approach
towards judicial decisions. The diﬃculty of deciding what is required by EU
law in any particular situation does not vary as between diﬀerent decision
makers and decisions-making processes. On the other hand, legal certainty
concerns are more convincing as a basis for the exceptional nature of Köbler
liability because of the strong resemblance between the initial proceeding
culminating in a decision of a ﬁnal appeal court, and the subsequent Köbler
liability action.
In terms of explaining the diﬀerence, the considerations which lead to
diﬀerentiated application of liability criteria in EU law generally apply with
less force in the international law setting. Interestingly, the further discussion
of legal certainty illustrated both the need to avoid over-generalization, and the
possibility of suggesting a generalization. The strength of legal certainty
concerns varies between diﬀerent international law settings depending on the
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extent to which the context in question departs from the classical model of
international law as being clearly separated from national law and as involving
relations between states. On the other hand, all international contexts involve a
transition between adjudication at the national and international levels. It
appears to be accepted that res judicata concerns do not outweigh the power of
the international tribunal to rule on the alleged wrong. The balance settles at a
diﬀerent point in Köbler liability actions. Res judicata concerns have more
weight here because the dispute is retained within the national level of
adjudication. The tightened application of liability criteria can be seen as a
means of preserving the authority of the ﬁnal appeal court decision at issue in
the Köbler liability action.
The second explanation posited regard to the legal traditions of Member
States as an aspect of European integration. State liability for ﬁnal appeal court
decisions is generally not recognized in domestic legal orders. The permission
to apply liability criteria in a tightened manner can be seen as an
accommodation to national legal traditions making it more likely that whole-
state liability will become an embedded feature across Member States. In
contrast, when international tribunals address state liability for judicial
decisions, there is less need to think about any process of integration and
prevailing national traditions so that the state unity theory can be permitted to
result in undiﬀerentiated liability conditions.
The third explanation considered the risk of Köbler liability actions
damaging relations between the ECJ and national courts of ﬁnal appeal
based on the possibility of liability being imposed after a reference to the
ECJ. Tightened application of liability criteria will assist in maintaining a
collegiate relationship. In contrast, it is a less sensitive matter for an
international court to adjudicate on whether national court judgments comply
with international law. There is less of a community of courts whose ethos is
capable of being damaged by the imposition of state liability. The fourth
explanation shifted the focus from tensions between the ECJ and supreme
courts, to tension within domestic court hierarchies based on ﬁnal appeal
court decisions being reviewed by lower courts. Again, tightening the
application of liability criteria can defuse this tension by reducing the
likelihood of the most unpalatable outcome—the conﬁrmation of a manifest
and inexcusable error. In contrast, the externality of the international judicial
body means that it can evaluate and impose state responsibility in a relatively
uninhibited manner.
These explanations provide a means of thinking about why state unity
results in undiﬀerentiated attribution, but not undiﬀerentiated application of
liability criteria in EU law. Their cumulative weight is probably such as to
render unlikely a clariﬁcation by the ECJ in the direction of aligning the
liability case law. Such a clariﬁcation is not however inconceivable, especially
if national courts were to adopt an overly restrictive approach, most likely by
interpreting the requirement of a manifest infringement as an ‘insurmountable
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obstacle’.86 Clariﬁcations which soften liability criteria are not unprecedented
in ECJ jurisprudence87 and the robustness with which the limitations in Italy
were rejected in Traghetti88 and Commission v Italy89 might be viewed as an
indication in this direction. The international law position could provide a
supporting rationale for such a clariﬁcation just as it did in establishing whole-
state liability.
86 This phrase is a reference to the title of Beutler’s article cited at n 4.
87 For example, the ECJ’s case law from the late 1970s in the analogous context of the EU’s
own non-contractual liability could once be read as requiring conduct which verged on the
arbitrary. In 1993, the Court clariﬁed that, ‘. . .the concept of arbitrary conduct as mentioned only in
the judgments in Joined Cases 116/77 and 124/77 Amylum v Council and Commission [1979] ECR
3497 and in Case 143/77 Koninklijke Scholten-Honig v Council and Commission [1979] ECR
3583 . . . does not provide a basis for holding that a ﬁnding of conduct verging on the arbitrary
represents a necessary condition or formulation for the Community to be rendered liable within the
framework of the EEC Treaty. . .’ (Case C–220/91 P) Commission v Stahlwerke Peine-Salzgitter
ECR I–2393 para 51.
88 The Court considered the Italian legislation which precluded state liability in relation to the
judicial interpretation of provisions of law or assessment of facts and evidence to be ‘tantamount to
rendering meaningless the principles laid down by the Court in the Köbler judgment’. Traghetti (n
34) para 36.
89 n 38.
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